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“At Home” is a short story by Anton Chekhov about a lawyer, Eugene Bikovsky, who 
tries to explain to his seven year-old son, Seriozha, why he did wrong by taking a 
cigarette from his desk and by smoking it.1 The story begins with Bikovsky coming 
home from a session at the court, and with the governess telling him about his son’s 
wrongdoing. Seriozha is a frail and innocent child; he admires and loves his father; 
he is entrusted to the care of a governess since the lost of his mother.  
Bikovsky wonders what to tell his son, but before he had time to think of anything 
to say, Seriozha has already entered the study. “’Good evening, papa,’ he says in a 
gentle voice, climbing on to his father’s knee and swiftly kissing his neck. ‘Did you 
send for me?” When they began to talk, Bikovsky finds that his son is not at all aware 
that he has committed any fault. The lawyer first appeals to pure rationality; he tries 
to explain to the child the conceptual distinction between meum and tuum in 
property law, and why it is wrong to take things that belong to others. But Seriozha 
has a world of his own in his mind and pays little attention to his father’s abstract 
explanations.  
Next Bikovsky tries to convey his disapproval of his son’s behaviour by arguing 
that smoking itself is wrong, because “tobacco is very bad for the health, and men 
who smoke die sooner than they should”. But the result is equally fruitless, not least 
because the father is unable to justify why he smokes himself. The lawyer is now 
frustrated by his inability to get through to Seriozha, but then he suddenly realizes 
that to communicate effectively with his son, he must appeal to another strategy. 
Instead of using a purely objective logic, he has to enter the subjective world of his 
son in a manner that will enable him to convey the message about the perils of 
smoking for a child. Bikovsky improvises a story of a king who had a long, grey beard 
and lived in a palace of crystal surrounded by a wonderful garden with oranges and 
bergamot pears and wild cherry trees.  
 
“The old king had only one son, who was heir to the kingdom, a little boy, 
just as little as you are. He was a good boy; he was never capricious, and 
he went to bed early, and never touched anything on his father’s table (…). 
He had only one failing – he smoked (…). Because he smoked, the king’s 
son fell ill of consumption and died when he was twenty years old. The old 
man, decrepit and ill, was left without anyone to take care of him, and 
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there was no one to govern the kingdom or to protect the palace. Foes 
came and killed the old man and destroyed the palace, and now there are 
no wild cherry trees left in the garden, and no birds and no bells.”  
 
The tale makes a deep impression on Seriozha. His eyes become full of sadness and, 
after a minute of reflection, he says in a low voice: ‘I won’t smoke any more-‘. 
Chekhov’s story concludes with the father wondering why is it so hard to present 
morality as the result of purely abstract logic, and always become more acceptable 
when it is accompanied by examples, parables, or stories that directly relate to the 
listener’s (or the reader’s) personal experience, interests and concerns. 
This article’s purpose is neither to discuss the value of narrative ethics nor to 
evaluate the role that stories might have in moral education. Rather, it intends to 
focus on another issue conveyed by Chekhov’s story: do our moral decisions need to 
be guided by principles? My intention here is to argue that, although principles play 
a key role in our moral judgments, these latter cannot be reduced to a result of 
purely deductive reasoning, since they previously require another kind of rationality. 
Instead of being purely deductive, our moral decisions appear to be the result of a 
combined inductive-deductive process. This claim is developed in two parts. The 
first part briefly presents some of the criticisms levelled in recent decades against 
purely deductive moral theories. The second part argues, appealing to Aristotle’s 
account of the knowledge’s process, that an inductive-deductive model provides a 
more realistic account of how sound moral judgments are actually made. 
 
 
The Criticism of Deductive Moral Theories  
 
During the last decades there has been extensive criticism of the dominance and 
adequacy of principles to guide ethical decisions. Some scholars even speak of an 
“empirical turn” in this field and suggest that we are entering nito a new phase in the 
history of ethics, which is characterized by an increasing emphasis on context 
sensitivity.2 This discussion was especially intense in the field of medical ethics, 
where critics of the so-called “principlism” as developed by Beauchamp and 
Childress,3 have faulted this theory for being “too abstract, too rationalistic, and too 
far removed from the psychological milieu in which moral choices are actually 
made.”4 But this debate is obviously not limited to the field of medical ethics. 
Rather, it takes place in the broader philosophical context of dissatisfaction with the 
very idea of appealing to abstract principles for making moral decisions. The doubts 
take various forms but include, among others, the question of whether moral 
judgements can be codified or captured by any theoretical structure, and therefore, 
whether our moral lives can be reduced to the legalistic application of a set of 
principles.5  
One of the first key essays to raise doubts about deductive ethical theories was 
Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”, originally published in 1958.6 In 
this paper, the British philosopher criticized what she characterized as a “law 
conception of ethics”. Appealing to Aristotle, she called for a return to concepts such 
as character, virtue and human flourishing, that is, for relying on persons rather 
than on norms. From this perspective, the key question of ethics is not so much 
“what I should do”, as Kant claimed, but rather “how can I become a good person?”. 
The point is that morality does not merely consist in doing certain kinds of actions; 
instead it is about being a particular kind of person. Of course, to move towards this 
latter objective, the moral agent needs to do (or to abstain from) certain actions, and 
this inevitably means to comply with some moral norms that command (or 
disapprove) them. Even though, from this approach, formalized moral principles are 
not regarded as end in themselves; they are rather means that aim to contribute to 
the flourishing of oneself, of others, and of society at large. In addition, virtue 
ethicists emphasize that equally or even more important than externally doing 
certain things is to internally adhere to the goods which are pursued with those 
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particular actions, and this latter condition is impossible to meet without personal 
virtues.  
Another seminal paper in this line was Michael Stocker’s “The Schizophrenia of 
Modern Ethical Theory,” published in 1976.7 Stocker argues that deontological and 
utilitarian moral theories create a serious dichotomy between the principles they 
advocate and the motives that inspire moral agents in real life. This situation leads 
practitioners of such theories to suffer from a “moral schizophrenia” because they 
will necessarily have a gap between their values and their real motives for action. 
Stocker calls such a gap a “malady of spirit” and suggests that, because these 
theories result in this malady, they are seriously flawed. To illustrate this, he gives 
several examples of persons who are possible candidates for morally schizophrenic 
utilitarians and deontologists. In one of them, the fictitious Smith, who is committed 
to Kantianism, comes to visit a sick friend at the hospital, and cannot admit to 
himself that he is doing so because he enjoys his friend’s company, or wants to cheer 
him up (these would constitute “heteronomous” motives). He feels obliged to think 
that he is visiting his friend solely out of a sense of duty. Therefore, he will 
experience an internal conflict between his theoretical principles and his real 
motives, and make his moral life schizophrenic. According to Stocker, this and other 
similar examples show well that what, in the end, is lacking in deductive moral 
theories is simply love for the other person, which is an essential feature of the most 
significant human relationships and constitutive of a human life worth living. 
In this same line of thinking, MacIntyre has advocated for a radical change in the 
way we think about morality and for a return to a virtue-centred ethics. His 
hypothesis is that modern moral theories (namely, deontology and utilitarianism) 
have failed because they have rejected Aristotle's claim that human beings have an 
intrinsic good or end (telos) to aim for, and have ignored the fact that we cannot 
reach this natural end without proper preparation, which consists in an adequate 
education and in the personal effort in the practice of virtues.8 
Thus, the key point raised by the above mentioned scholars is that moral life does 
not consist in merely learning some rules and then making sure that each of our 
actions live up to those rules. The idea that knowing moral theories is enough for 
making sound moral decisions is as naive as expecting that just by reading a book 
about how to swim one will be able to swim. As an Aristotelian would say, moral life 
only becomes possible by the effort aimed at developing good habits of character, 
and never by normative argument as such. In reality, when the individual is shaped 
by certain habits of virtuous conduct, the recourse to strict arguments is rather 
superfluous. This does not mean that the adequacy of one’s judgments is measured 
by pure inner conviction, but only that one’s capacity to distinguish between good 
and bad judgments cannot be reduced to pure science.9 
From a different philosophical standpoint, Bernard Williams has addressed 
similar criticisms to both utilitarianism and deontologism. In his view, both theories 
have represented a flight from reality, and failed to understand the complexity of 
moral choices.10 Williams insisted on the need for what he called “internal reasons 
for action,” which relate to our genuine reasons to act and are connected with things 
that we really care about. In his view, mere “external” arguments —for example, the 
proposition that X is morally good— cannot really move us to act. We will only have 
a reason to act if there is something contingently about us (our personal education, 
our psychological states, our feelings, etc.) that motivates us to behave in a 
particular way.11 In addition, Williams has stressed the crucial importance of the 
historical context for any account of morality. On the ground that it is impossible to 
provide “a general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles,”12 
he rejected both Rawls’ contractualism and Hare’s utilitarianism as they erroneously 
assume a reflective agent capable of distancing himself from the life and character he 
is examining.13 In contrast to both philosophers, Williams envisions a non-
theoretical process beginning and ending with socially and historically conditioned 
ethical intuitions. 
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Also the proponents of casuistry and moral particularism are severe critics of 
principle-based approaches in ethics. Advocates of casuistry claim that absolute 
moral principles are “tyrannical” and do not play any substantial role in justifying 
particular moral judgements. In their view, we start from particular cases in which 
we are confident of our judgements and then reason by analogy by comparing each 
new situation with others and with paradigm cases.14 But casuists accept, at least, 
the generalization that cases can be sufficiently similar so that we should judge them 
similarly.15 In this respect, moral particularists are even more radical in their 
rejection of generalizations. For instance, Jonathan Dancy maintains that what is a 
reason in one case may be no reason at all in another, or even a reason on the other 
side. In his view, a feature that makes one action better can make another one worse, 
and make no difference at all to a third. Therefore, moral reasons are necessarily 





This paper argues that some of the above mentioned shortcomings of purely 
deductive ethical theories could be better addressed by appealing to a more 
comprehensive, inductive-deductive understanding of moral reasoning. This model 
includes a first inductive step in which we abstract from our experience the specific 
normative criteria relevant to the case at hand, and a second step in which we 
deduce what to do by applying those criteria to that particular situation. Actually, 
this seems to be the way in which we make our moral judgments in everyday life, 
often without being aware of it. 
 
 
Induction: Moving from Experience to General Principles  
 
One of the first philosophers, if not the first, to develop a careful explanation of 
the inductive-deductive model of thinking was Aristotle. His understanding of the 
cognition process is considered as one of his most influential contributions to the 
philosophy of science. In this regard, it has been said that “current explanations of 
the scientific method feature Aristotle's iterative process as the central core.”17 From 
specific observations, inductive reasoning provides general principles (bottom-up 
movement), and with those principles serving as premises, deduction attempts to 
explain observed phenomena (top-down movement). This leads to successive cycles 
of observations and generalizations, back up again to observations to verify concepts 
and to obtain more accurate generalizations. 
Aristotle’s understanding of the cognition process, which can be found in the 
opening lines of the Metaphysics, is especially developed in the Posterior Analytics, 
where he argues that our intellect (nous) grasps first principles through induction 
(epagoge).18 He distinguishes five stages in this process: 1) Perception (aisthesis) 
discriminates among particulars. 2) Memory retains these perceptions. 3) Repeated 
memories develop experience of a universal (katholou). 4) Higher universals are 
inferred. 5) First principles are inferred.19  
Interestingly, Aristotle claims that the inductive-deductive process does not only 
apply to theoretical knowledge but also to practical reasoning. In the Nicomachean 
Ethics he maintains that the first principles (archai) of both science and morality 
find their source in inductive reasoning and those principles inferred from 
experience constitute the starting point of deductive reasoning. One of the relevant 
passages is the following: “induction supplies a first principle or universal, 
deduction works from universals; therefore, there are first principles from which 
deduction starts, which cannot be proved by deduction (syllogismos); therefore, 
they are reached by induction (epagoge)”.20  
Because Aristotle assigns a foundational role to perception in his account of 
knowledge and concept-acquisition, it is not surprising that he is often thought of as 
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the first empiricist. Even the well-known axiom Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius 
fuerit in sensu (Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses), which is 
often associated with the philosophical position of British empiricists, notably John 
Locke, has in reality its roots in Aristotle’s thinking21, which later inspired Thomas 
Aquinas.22 It is noteworthy that Locke used this argument in order to criticize 
Descartes' theory of innate ideas and to make the case that all our ideas have their 
origin in experience. But Aristotle’s and Locke’s views are in this regard radically 
different. In Aristotle, empirical data are just the starting point of knowledge, but 
knowledge is much more than a mere association of simple ideas, as Locke claims.23 
For the Greek philosopher, our minds are so constituted as to be able to transcend 
the material realm and reach universal concepts by abstraction, and this is precisely 
what empiricists deny. Induction entails, according to Aristotle, a real process of 
abstraction. It is indeed a kind of rationality, and not a mere feeling, even if reason 
operates here in an implicit or informal way. How is the passage made from 
sensitive cognition to an intellective one? The Aristotelian explanation is that, once 
exposed to the power of our intellect, sensible objects lose their individualizing 
matter, and that what remains in our minds is the concept of each of them, which 
assumes the character of universality. As a matter of fact, without this first 
abstraction step, intellectual knowledge would be impossible. 
In any case, experiences play a crucial role in this process. We cannot come to 
know the first premises of knowledge without such experience of particulars, in the 
same way that we cannot see colours without the presence of coloured objects.24 In 
other words, induction is the transformation of sense perception into knowledge 
that goes beyond the limited data of experience. This is why induction involves a 
kind of “creation from nothing,” since human experience is inevitably individual, 
whereas concepts are universal.25 Thus, for Aristotle, the first principles of moral 
reasoning are obtained by induction, and cannot be demonstrated, but only 
assumed. Contrary to what is often believed, he does not claim that we derive those 
principles from the concept of “nature” or “natural” (this is why he does not commit 
any “naturalistic fallacy”). In his view, only non-inferentially justified first principles 
make moral knowledge possible without facing an infinite regress or a vicious circle; 
this is for him the only alternative to scepticism.  
This recourse to first principles is often seen in contemporary discussions as a 
weak point of Aristotelian philosophy, since “nothing is more generally unacceptable 
in recent philosophy than any conception of a first principle”.26 However the fact is 
that no philosophical system attempting to bring some substantive account of truth 
can avoid relying, at least implicitly, on some first, non-demonstrable principles. As 
Richard Hare writes, “many of the ethical theories which have been proposed in the 
past may without injustice be called ‘Cartesian’ in character: that is to say, they try to 
deduce particular duties from some self-evident first principle”.27 These principles 
mark a starting-point of these theories (for instance, the Categorical Imperative in 
Kantian ethics, or the principle of utility in Mill and Bentham). The advantage of 
Aristotelian ethics in this respect lies in its attempt to stay as close as possible to 
common sense, and in its effort to reflect the complexity of moral decisions in real 
life. This puts in evidence what a scholar calls the “tremendous modesty” that 
characterizes Aristotelian ethics.28 
But there is an additional clue supporting the Aristotelian claim that the basic 
moral principles are obtained by induction from experience, and that theoretical 
explanations come along afterwards to explain what was already implicitly known: 
the fact, well-documented by anthropological studies, that basic moral standards are 
remarkably similar in all cultures, in spite of them having very different traditions 
and social and religious backgrounds. The best-known example of this is the Golden 
Rule, which embodies an ethics of reciprocity (“Do not do to others what you do not 
want them to do to you”), and can be found in virtually the same wording in all 
major cultures and religions. But there are many examples of other more substantive 
norms that are strikingly similar among cultures, though expressed in different 
conceptual terms or with different emphasis.29 How can this phenomenon be 
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explained? My hypothesis is that we all, as humans, share the use of practical reason 
(ie. the use of reason concerning action) and are therefore able to identify from our 
experience the most basic human goods or interests for us and for the society in 
which we live. On this basis, we infer the principles that command (or forbid) certain 
behaviours, depending on whether they contribute or not to those basic goods, or 
interests, or needs. 
 
 
Deduction: Moving from General Principles to Particular Conclusions 
 
According to Aristotle, the underlying structure of practical reasoning is always the 
same. We move up from individual experiences to a general moral principle and 
then down to a concrete application of the principle to the particular situation in 
which we are placed. For instance, as we are growing up, we come to understand 
that generosity is a good thing. As an adult I am confronted with somebody in need 
(eg. an aged and lonely neighbour who is ill in bed and needs to get a medicine from 
the pharmacy). After having induced from the circumstances of the case the morally 
relevant factors, and having (implicitly) in mind the first principle of morality (good 
is to be done and evil avoided), I reason: Generosity is a good thing; helping this 
person is generosity; so I go to the pharmacy and buy the drug for him.   
In this top-down movement from universal knowledge to a set of particulars, the 
central role is played by practical wisdom (phronesis, or prudentia). Phronesis is the 
“right reason in matters of conduct.”30 It is concerned with how to act in particular 
situations; it makes us choose the right means to achieve good ends; it enables us to 
act in the right way, for the right reasons, and at the right time; it is the ability to 
determine what ought to be done in the concrete case. From this it is not difficult to 
see that practical wisdom cannot be achieved by a mere mechanical rule-following. 
As MacIntyre writes “knowing which rule to apply in which situation and being able 
to apply that rule relevantly are not themselves rule-governed activities”.31 In other 
words, the application of rules itself requires an exercise of judgment. This is why 
phronesis is, in Aristotle’s terms, an intellectual, not a moral virtue. However, it still 
entails practical, not speculative reasoning: it is not exercised in order to know 
something, but in order to do something. 
An important point to stress here is that, for Aristotle, practical reasoning is an 
approximate form of reasoning. It is not exact theory as mathematics or physics are. 
In his view we must be content if, in dealing with ethical subjects, we succeed in 
“presenting a broad outline of the truth.”32 Since practical wisdom deals with 
contingent matters (ie. with things that can be other than they are) it cannot be 
codified in advance in a very detailed fashion. The problem is not that there is no 
definite right and wrong but rather that reliable standards of right and wrong have 
to be applied to the variable conditions of human life.  
But, of course, we also reason theoretically about morality matters. If a colleague 
asks me my view on, say, human cloning, the moral judgement that I make does not 
aim to do something, or to apply the general principles to a particular case, but 
simply to develop an argument on a specific topic. Here I engage in reasoning that is 
directed at the resolution of questions that are theoretical rather than practical. 
Knowledge is here pursued for its own sake, and without ulterior purpose or 
practical application. One is tempted to say that in such situations we use a purely 
deductive reasoning to come to a conclusion. But induction is also here present, 
although in a less immediate way. As mentioned above, both theoretical and 
practical knowledge proceed using an inductive-deductive reasoning. When we are 
confronted with purely theoretical issues, the principles that we apply to come to a 
conclusion are not inferred from a concrete case, but have been induced from our 






In sum, do our moral judgements need to be guided by principles? The answer is: 
yes. Because how could it be otherwise? If morality is not a merely descriptive 
undertaking but has, at its core, a normative dimension, how could it avoid the 
recourse to some guiding standards? But they should not be simply imposed a 
priori; this is an excessively artificial, counterfactual, and inoperative way of 
conceiving them. Principles should be “empirically informed and less reductionistic 
than in current conceptions”.33 They must be the result of a process of induction by 
moral agents themselves, and only afterwards be conceptually structured in their 
own minds to help them decide what to do in a particular situation (practical 
reasoning), or what to think in moral terms about some general topic (theoretical 
reasoning).    
The crucial point is that moral agents should, as far as possible, gain access to 
moral norms ‘from the inside’, and not have them imposed ‘from the outside’. This is 
not a merely academic debate, but has very practical consequences, also in the 
specific field of medical ethics. For instance, in recent years a number of scholars 
have stressed the importance of promoting dialogue, deliberation, and story-telling 
as starting points for a more fruitful decision-making process in clinical practice.34 
The use of inductive-deductive reasoning is also encouraged today as the best way 
for adequately teaching medical ethics: rather than setting out a range of disparate 
and often conflicting theories at the beginning, it is recommended to start by 
examining particular moral problems and seek to build up to a unified theory from 
the answers given to the cases.35 Similarly, it has been suggested that the promotion 
of empathy among medical students by confronting them to concrete cases should 
become a priority of ethics education.36 
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